Abstract-Theorem 5 of A. Gohari, V. Anantharam, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 56, no. 8, pp. 3973-3996, 2010, states an upper bound on the secrecy capacity for the source model problem. It has a three page proof given in Appendix B of the paper. Unfortunately, we show that this bound does not provide any improvement over the simpler bound given in Corollary 1 of the paper. We also provide an example of a family of two agent source model problems where the one-way secrecy rate in each direction is zero, but the secrecy rate is nonzero and can be determined exactly as a conditional mutual information. T HE paper [1] studies the source model problem for the general case of key agreement between multiple legitimate parties. For clarity of exposition, we restrict the presentation here to the special case of two legitimate parties, but our comments apply to the general case as well.
key rate is at least R s − . The supremum of the achievable key rates is called the secret key capacity and denoted by S(X; Y Z).
The secret key capacity is known for the following few distributions p (x, y, z) . It is shown in [2] that if X → Y → Z form a Markov chain then S(X; Y Z) = I (X; Y |Z). Furthermore, the capacity is achievable via one-way communication from Alice to Bob. It is also known that S(X; Y Z) = I (X; Y |Z) holds for the product of reversely degraded sources, i.e. when X = (X 1 , X 2 ), Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) and Z = (Z 1 , Z 2 ) where (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ) is independent of (X 2 , Y 2 , Z 2 ) and X 1 → Y 1 → Z 1 and Y 2 → X 2 → Z 2 hold. The idea is to achieve a secrecy rate I (X 1 ; Y 1 |Z 1 ) by a one-way communication from Alice to Bob, and to achieve a secrecy rate I (X 2 ; Y 2 |Z 2 ) by a one-way communication from Bob to Alice. This gives a total of
The above are the only cases where the secret key capacity is known, and both cases are based on the one-way key rate. In the Appendix, we provide a simple example in which the one-way secrecy rate in either direction, of Alice to Bob, or Bob to Alice, is zero, but the secrecy capacity can be exactly found to be equal to S(X; Y Z) = I (X; Y |Z) > 0. 3 See also [7] - [10] for some recent studies of the source model problem.
We need a definition before stating [1, Thm. 5] . Given a function f : R → R, let S f −one−way be defined as follows: 
When f (x) = kx for some constant k, the above upper bound reduces to a simpler bound given in [1, Corollary 1] . Herein, we show that the above bound does not provide any better upper bound than the one obtained by setting f (x) = kx. Thus, the bound of [1, Thm. 5] reduces to the bound of Corollary 1 of the paper.
Consider equation (1) . Having some V − U − X − Y Z, take some T independent of all previously defined variables, and definẽ
. 3 Maurer and Wolf [4] construct an example in which the two one-way secrecy rates from Alice to Bob, and from Bob to Alice are both zero, while See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
Given an increasing convex function f , the difference
According to Lemma 1 given below, one of the following will occur: 
.
from the additivity and non-decreasing properties of g(·) we conclude that g(·) is linear.
As a result of the above discussion, two explicit upper bounds on S(X; Y Z) are given in [1] :
There is no discussion of cardinality bounds on the alphabet of auxiliary variables in [1] . The cardinality of J in B 1 (X; Y Z) can be bounded by |X ||Y||Z| using Fenchel's extension of the Carathéodory theorem. For B 2 (X; Y Z), the cardinality of U and V can be bounded from above by |U| ≤ |X | 2 |Y| 2 and |V| ≤ |X ||Y| (see [11, Thm. 22.4] ). However, it is not clear if one can find a bound on the cardinality of J in B 2 (X; Y Z). Therefore, we can replace infimum with minimum and supremum with maximum wherever cardinality bounds are available:
Therefore, while B 1 is computable, B 2 cannot be computed explictly. This is not to say that upper bound B 2 is useless. Any arbitrary choice of J does give us a valid upper bound. We simply cannot find the best possible upper bound that we can obtain using B 2 (X; Y Z).
A different upper bound was recently proposed in [12] , wherein it is shown that S(X; Y Z) is bounded from above by
Here the infimum is over all quantum systems J with an arbitrary joint state with classical variables X, Y, Z according to some ρ J xyz as follows:
As argued in [12] , while the auxiliary random variable J in B 1 (X; Y Z) computes a lower convex envelope, the "quantum convexification" by an auxiliary system J is not well understood (see [13] 
APPENDIX
Let R be a uniform Bernouli random variable. We pass R through three independent erasure channels with parameter to obtain X, Y and Z.
Thus, p(x, y, z, r ) = p(r ) p B EC (x|r ) p B EC (y|r ) p B EC (z|r ).
This joint pmf is similar to the one considered in [3] , except that in [3] random variable R is passed through independent BSC channels. Observe that because of the symmetry
for all a, b ∈ {0, 1, e}. Therefore, the oneway secrecy rates are zero. Furthermore, X, Y and Z do not form a Markov chain in any order. Since we always have S(X; Y Z) ≤ I (X; Y |Z) [2] , [14] , we obtain S(X; Y Z) ≤ (1 − ) 2 . The proof sketch for showing that (1 − ) 2 is an achievable secrecy rate is as follows. Take some δ > 0. Assuming that Alice, Bob and Eve observe X n , Y n and Z n respectively, Alice and Bob reveal the location of their erasures on the public channel. The number of locations where neither Alice nor Bob's bits are erased is at least n((1 − ) 2 − δ) with probability tending to one as n tends to infinity. Observe that the location of erasures of Alice and Bob is independent of the bits observed by Alice and Bob in the non-erased locations. Thus, Alice and Bob can agree on n((1 − ) 2 − δ) bits, which are independent of the communication used to reveal the erasure locations. However, each of these bits is observed by Eve with probability 1 − , and we need to apply privacy amplification on the common bits to produce secure bits. If we let A = B denote the common bit of Alice and Bob, and Z denote Eve's observation, the conditional entropy H (A|Z) is equal to , which gives the rate at which we can extract bits from A that are secure from Z. If Alice and Bob create a random hash (or random binning) of output size n((1 − ) 2 − δ)( − δ) of the n((1 − ) 2 − δ) bits, the hash index will be almost independent of Eve's observation.
